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Abstract 
The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or drones in counterterrorism has changed the face of 
warfare and is challenging International Law on a number of levels. This paper assesses some 
of those challenges in the context of the Obama Administration’s justifications to use drones 
for targeted killing. It focusses on the US as norm entrepreneur that purposefully works to 
alter prevalent norms related to the use of drones in counterterrorism efforts. The paper 
analyses normative developments and the meaning-in-use of existing legal provisions that are 
invoked to justify US policy in this area. By focussing on norm entrepreneurs, this paper moves 
away from purely structural accounts of normative change towards a stronger emphasis on 
actors and the role of agency. Rather than understanding US drone policy as violating 
International Law, this paper argues that the Obama administration was acting as norm 
entrepreneur in its counterterrorism efforts, aiming to change the meaning of a number of 
international legal concepts to justify its policy decisions.  
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Drone Warfare in Counterterrorism and Normative Change: US Policy and the Politics of 
International Law 
 
"Very frankly, it's the only game in town in terms of confronting or trying to disrupt the al 
Qaeda leadership,"1  
 
The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or ‘drones’ in US counterterrorism efforts has 
increased exponentially in recent years and changed the face of warfare. Especially the CIA-
run drone programme is challenging international law on a number of levels. This paper 
assesses a number of such challenges to evaluate what they mean for international law and 
the development of international norms more generally. Existing ‘drones’ debates in the 
literature are mainly in the field of international law, examining the legality of drones2, as well 
as in the area of political theory that focus on the morality of drone warfare and Just War 
Theory dimensions.3  There is an emerging literature dealing with the (relatively) new practice 
and evolving norm of targeted killing4 as well as broader debates surrounding how new 
technologies influence normative change5. This paper adds to this literature but also takes a 
different approach by focussing on the US as norm entrepreneur that purposefully works to 
                                                 
1Then-CIA Director Leon Panetta "U.S. Airstrikes in Pakistan Called 'Very Effective'," 18 May 2009.  
2See for instance Philip Alston, "The Cia and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders," Harvard National Security Journal 
2, no. 2 (2011); W. Jason Fisher, "Targeted Killing, Norms, and International Law," Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 45, no. 3 (2007); Afsheen John Radsan and Richard Murphy, "The Evolution of Law and Policy 
for Cia Targeted Killing," Journal of National Security Law and Policy 5 (2012); Jonathan Ulrich, "The Gloves Were 
Never On: Defining the President's Authority to Order Targeted Killing in the War against Terrorism," Virginia 
Journal of International Law 45, no. 4 (2005); Gabriella Blum and Philip Heymann, "Law and Policy of Targeted 
Killing," Harvard National Security Journal 1 (2010).  
3See for instance Daniel Brunstetter and Megan Braun, "The Implications of Drones on the Just War Tradition," 
Ethics & International Affairs 25, no. 3 (2011); Daniel Brunstetter and Arturo Jimenez-Barcardi, "Clashing over 
Drones: The Legal and Normative Gap between the United States and the Human Rights Community," The 
International Journal of Human Rights 19, no. 2 (2015); John Williams, "Distant Intimacy: Space, Drones, and Just 
War," Ethics & International Affairs 29, no. 1 (2015); John Kaag and Sarah Kreps, Drone Warfare (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2014).  
4See for instance: Betcy Jose, "Not Completely the New Normal: How Human Rights Watch Tried to Suppress 
the Targeted Killing Norm," Contemporary Security Policy 38, no. 2 (2017a); "Bin Laden's Targeted Killing and 
Emerging Norms," Critical Studies on Terrorism 10, no. 1 (2017b); Rebecca Sanders, "Legal Frontiers: Targeted 
Killing at the Borders of War," Journal of Human Rights 13, no. 4 (2014). And Contemporary Security Policy: 
Special Issue: The Transformation of Targeted Killing and International Order, 38, no. 2 (2017). 
5For instance Theo Farrell, "Transnational Norms and Military Development:: Constructing Ireland's Professional 
Army," European Journal of International Relations 7, no. 1 (2001); Elvira Rosert et al., "Arms Control Norms and 
Technology," in Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control: Interests, Conflict and Justice, ed. Harald Müller 
and Carmen Wunderlich (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 2013); Richard Price, "A Genealogy 
of the Chemical Weapons Taboo," International Organization 49, no. 1 (1995); Regina Heller, Martin Kahl, and 
Daniela Pisoiu, "The 'Dark' Side of Normative Argumentation: The Case of Counterterrorism Policy," Global 
Constitutionalism 1, no. 2 (2012). 
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alter prevalent norms related to the use of drones in counterterrorism efforts. The 
contribution to existing literature is thus two-fold: firstly, the main focus of the analysis is on 
the way the US contested already established standards with the aim of altering them in the 
process.6 The paper analyses normative developments and arguments related to the 
meaning-in-use of existing legal provisions that are invoked to justify US policy related to the 
use of drones in counterterrorism. And secondly, by focussing on norm entrepreneurs, this 
paper moves away from purely structural accounts of normative change towards a stronger 
emphasis on actors and the role of agency within that structure.7 This approach provides a 
strong focus on the norm dynamics, assessing norms that have already been established, but 
whose meaning-in-use is now contested.  The emphasis on norm contestedness goes beyond 
analyses of norm emergence and initiation and allows for an analysis of norm change in later 
stages of a norm’s life cycle. In this way, the analysis highlights the “productive power of 
international rules and norms.”8 The paper focusses on the Obama administration’s use of 
drones which set precedents that are still relevant for the current Trump Presidency. At the 
time of writing, it is unclear what the exact policies of the Trump administration will be with 
regards to UAVs but it is important to understand where the preceding administration stood 
in order to establish the current government’s point of departure. 
 
The US government is currently engaged in two different drone programmes: one run by the 
military as part of its counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and one run by 
the CIA as part of its counterterrorism campaign to stop al Qaeda and ‘associated forces’. The 
US military is running an overt drone programme, only in places where US troops are 
stationed as part of an ongoing conflict, using drones as weapons to support existing missions. 
The CIA drone programme, on the other hand, is covert and individual drone strikes are 
                                                 
6Existing studies primarily focus on emerging and new norms of targeted killing and contestation to them. For 
instance Jose (2017b) utilises the norm life cycle model to trace the emergence of a ‘new’ targeted killing norm. 
Heller, Kahl, and Pisoiu focus on the development of ‘bad’ norms and processes of norm erosion in this context. 
And similarly, Bob analyses the evolving targeted killing norm and rival networks that either promote or resist 
the new norm. (Clifford Bob, "Rival Networks and the Conflict over Assassination/Targeted Killing," in Norm 
Antipreneurs and the Politics of Resistance to Global Normative Change, ed. Alan Bloomfield and Shirley V. Scott 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2016)).  
7For a similar approach but focussing on different issue areas, see Harald Müller and Carmen Wunderlich, eds., 
Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control: Interests, Conflict and Justice (Athens, Georgia: The University of 
Georgia Press, 2013).  
8Ian Hurd, "Targeted Killing in International Relations Theory: Recursive Politics of Technology, Law, and 
Practice," Contemporary Security Policy 38, no. 2 (2017): 311.  
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neither confirmed nor denied. The CIA programme is controversial because it operates in 
areas the US military is not actively engaged in (as is for instance the case in Pakistan, Somalia, 
and Yemen). It is secretive, lacks transparency and it is largely kept away from judicial 
oversight and public scrutiny.  This paper will from here on focus on the use of drones as part 
of counterterrorism efforts rather than military counterinsurgency operations. 
 
The US cites a number of reasons for using drones: they have extensive strategic appeal 
especially because they can be used without great risk to own forces and about anywhere in 
the world. The number of drone strikes during the Obama Administration increased 
dramatically:  the Bureau of Investigative Journalism9 found that between 2004 and 2016 
there were 424 US drone attacks in Pakistan alone, 373 of which under Obama. “So this has 
become the Obama administration’s weapon of choice in pursuing what it no longer calls the 
Global War on Terror.”10 Drones themselves are not prohibited weapons, they are weapon 
carriers, similar to other military aircraft. But the possibility of using weapons remotely and 
against individuals in targeting killing operations is relatively new and raises a number of 
issues related to how they are covered by existing international laws and norms.  
 
Rather than understanding US drone policy as violating international law, this paper argues 
that the Obama administration was acting as norm entrepreneur in its counterterrorism 
efforts, aiming to change the meaning of a number of international legal concepts to justify 
its policy decisions. Its drone policy was framed as reflecting new long-term understandings 
of novel threats and available technologies which marked a departure from Bush-era 
arguments of ‘exceptionalism’ and ‘emergency exemptions’. Even though some argue that 
Obama’s challenges to international law differed mainly in style rather than substance11, this 
paper argues that the way the administration utilised existing legal frameworks to justify its 
conduct, is important as it aimed at a more long term contestation of relevant norms and laws 
rather than attempts to carve out short-term, temporary exemptions. The paper argues that 
the US was aiming to legitimate its actions with reference to international law in order to 
                                                 
9See https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war  
10David Luban, Drones: The Law and Ethics of Drone Strikes, podcast audio2013, 
http://podacademy.org/podcasts/drones-the-law-and-ethics-of-drone-strikes/.   
11See for instance Aiden Warren and Ingvild Bode, "Altering the Playing Field: The U.S. Redefintion of the Use-
of-Force," Contemporary Security Policy 36, no. 2 (2015).  
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construct a permissible normative order that at the same time stabilised its own powerful 
position in the international system. To develop the argument, this paper will look at 
discursive practices and strategies used by the US to shape international laws covering the 
use of lethal force to target individuals. It uses a social constructivist approach to understand 
complex and dynamic processes of norm developments. It particularly focusses on the US as 
norm entrepreneur in the norm contestation process and its attempts to institutionalise 
specific meanings of norms in the international order. The paper utilises a process tracing 
method12 which is useful to highlight “consistencies of norm entrepreneurial activities in the 
norm evolution process [which] has the potential to reveal and reassert the growing 
importance of ideas and shared norms and to offer a tool for identifying changes in the 
normative structure.”13 This method allows for emerging norms to be traced in relevant 
discourse: the paper analyses speeches and government documents by Obama and his 
advisors during his term in office (2009-2016) that sought to clarify US policy in relation to the 
use of drones in counterterrorism. The paper engages with the main available speeches and 
documents in which White House officials communicated the Administration’s policy, but the 
number of sources is limited for various reasons, not least because the government 
emphasised national security considerations which required it to keep its targeting decisions 
secret.  
 
Available speeches and documents are analysed to determine where and how norm 
entrepreneurship in terms of consciously setting wide-reaching precedents are discernible. 
The analysis focuses on instances that demonstrate different interpretations and framings of 
established legal provisions to contest previously accepted meanings. Obama issued very few 
policy statements during his time in office; only towards the end of his Presidency did he 
publish a more extensive outline of ‘Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding the United States’ 
Use of Military Force and Related National Security Operations’.14 The speeches by 
government officials during Obama’s two terms of office are therefore instructive in 
                                                 
12For a detailed discussion on the process tracing method see Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, Process 
Tracing (Cambridge University Press, 2014). Process tracing involves “the use of evidence from within a case to 
make inferences about causal explanations of that case.” (ibid, p. 4) 
13Annika Björkdahl, From Idea to Norm: Promoting Conflict Prevention (Lund: Lund University, 2002), 34.  
14The White House, "Report on the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding the United States' Use of Military Force 
and Related National Security Operations " (Washington, 2016).  
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understanding the administration’s approach towards new technologies and changes in 
warfare.  
 
The paper starts by outlining some theoretical considerations related to international law, 
norm development and norm entrepreneurs. The main focus is on normative developments 
and contestations to the meaning-in-use of existing international legal obligations that are 
used to justify policy choices.  Norms are not static givens, but “entail an inherently contested 
quality and therefore acquire meaning in relation to the specific contexts in which they are 
enacted.”15 In this context, the final parts of the paper analyse the main elements of the US 
drones programme and focus on a number of contested issues related to the current drone 
policy: namely the existence of non-international armed conflicts, questions of ‘self-defence’, 
and the principle of distinction.  
 
Theoretical considerations – International law and normative change 
International law incorporates formal, often written down rules as well as norms that are 
mainly unwritten expectations about appropriate behaviour. Norms16 are standards of 
appropriate behaviour and emerge from practice, communication as well as interaction 
between actors that generate shared understanding. These intersubjective understandings 
become guidance for the content of the norm and what is deemed to constitute ‘appropriate’ 
behaviour. The interpretation of norms requires establishing a relationship between formal 
validity (for instance through a treaty or customary law) and its social recognition, i.e. its 
appropriateness in a given context.17  
 
                                                 
15Antje Wiener and Uwe Puetter, "The Quality of Norms Is What Actors Make of It: Critical Constructivist 
Research on Norms," Journal of International Law and International Relations 5, no. 1 (2009): 7.  
16To clarify: I use concepts such as ‘norms’ and ‘rules’ in a predominantly International Relations, rather than a 
legal analysis, sense. I draw on international law and legal concepts for the analysis but I am not collapsing them 
into international law as such. Norms and their interpretations of course relate to debates surrounding 
customary law and particular its ‘opinio juris’ component, but they are not identical. For more on customary law 
see for instance Jason Beckett, "Customary International Law," in International Law for International Relations, 
ed. Basak Cali (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). Or Anthony Clark Arend, Legal Rules and International 
Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
17Wiener and Puetter,  10-11.  
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To understand change in international law, norms’ dual quality needs to be considered: they 
are “both structuring and socially constructed through interaction in a context.”18 Norms 
influence state practice; changing norms can lead to changes in state behaviour which in turn 
influences international law. Because state behaviour is influenced by norms, acts that might 
violate existing rules can – with sufficient support from other states – lead to a reformulation 
of those rules. Understanding how norms evolve and change is therefore crucial to 
understanding developments in international law.19 In this context, norms’ intersubjective 
dimension is important, “because norms by definition embody a quality of ‘oughtness’ and 
shared moral assessment, norms prompt justifications for action and leave an extensive trail 
of communication among actors that we can study”.20 Actors in the international system are 
constituted by intersubjectively created structures and resources; they have an inherent and 
internal incentive to comply with existing norms and rules. As Hurd argues, “States are 
constituted in such a way that they seek normative justification for their action. States are 
not actors independent of their relationship to norms and they cannot choose to make 
themselves disembedded from them. Instead, states attempt to legitimize new norms and 
thus change social relationships.”21 This means that even though the US might have the 
capacity to unilaterally reinterpret norms, it is doing so in the context of being embedded 
within the international system; it is not independent of it. The US’ interests are shaped by its 
normative environment as norms and interests constitute each other. Norms shape and 
constitute interests and they motivate action, which means that they “may provide states 
with both preferences and effective and legitimate strategies for pursuing these 
preferences.”22 
 
This paper does not call the stabilising function of norms into question, but instead 
emphasises their ambiguous and indeterminate nature. Following Wiener’s understanding of 
norms as being inherently contested, the focus of the analysis is on norm contestation (which 
                                                 
18Antje Wiener, The Invisible Constitution of Politics: Contested Norms and International Encounters (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 27.  
19See also Michael J. Glennon, "How International Legal Rules Die," Georgetown Law Joural 93, no. 3 (2005): 957.    
20Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International 
Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 892.   
21Ian Hurd, "Breaking and Making Norms: American Revisionism and Crises of Legitimacy," International Politics 
44, no. 2 (2007): 196.  
22Björkdahl, 20.  
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is seen as “norm-generative practice”23) to understand changes after a norm has been 
established. Contestation centres on the meaning of the norm in the eyes of different actors; 
a norm might be ambiguous or it may have not have an agreed upon intersubjective meaning. 
Contestation takes place over what is appropriate behaviour in this context and involves 
justifications for actions or questioning previously accepted meanings. As Müller and 
Wunderlich conclude, “contestation can be understood as the engine driving norm 
dynamics.”24   
 
One way of tracing norm dynamics is by looking at Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle 
model that illustrates how international norms emerge, develop and are incorporated into 
international society. The ‘life cycle’ consists of three stages: norm emergence, norm cascade, 
and norm internalisation. The life cycle starts with the emergence of a new norm, followed 
by its diffusion and cascade towards greater acceptance and is completed with the 
internalisation of a new norm as a fully incorporated rule in international society. Different 
actors, motives and influences are involved in various stages of the process. In this model, 
norm entrepreneurs call attention to ‘new’ issues and aim to convince a ‘critical mass’ of 
states (as norm leaders) to embrace new norms. Rather than looking at norm entrepreneurs’ 
role in the norm emergence stage, this paper analyses their role as “agents of social 
change”25, which means their role and ability to influence the process of norm contestation 
of already established and existing norms. In this sense, norm entrepreneurs, are “actors who 
set out to alter the prevalent normative order according to certain ideas and norms that they 
deem more suitable as compared to the existing one… In order to persuade the audience of 
the appropriateness and necessity of the propagated norm(s) and to recruit norm followers, 
they engage in processes of strategic social construction using ideational as well as material 
resources.”26 In the context of this paper’s analysis, the US is seen as acting as norm 
entrepreneur, not to establish new norms but much rather to advance ‘new’ interpretations 
of existing international legal concepts and diffuse them to justify its drone policies. The US is 
                                                 
23Antje Wiener, A Theory of Contestation (Heidelberg; New York: Springer, 2014), 27.  
24Harald Müller and Carmen Wunderlich, "Not Lost Im Contestation: How Norm Entrepreneurs Frame Norm 
Development in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," Contemporary Security Policy online view (2018).  
25Björkdahl, 45.  
26Carmen Wunderlich, "Theoretical Approaches in Norm Dynamics," in Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms 
Control: Interests, Conflict and Justice, ed. Harald Müller and Carmen Wunderlich (Athens, Georgia: The 
University of Georgia Press, 2013), 37. 
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challenging established interpretations of existing norms in order to advance new meanings 
to cover its use of novel technologies. This focus on change driven by agency (namely a norm 
entrepreneurs) rather than structure adds to constructivist research on norm dynamics.  
 
To be clear, a state that is acting as norm entrepreneur often engages in this behaviour to 
further its own self-interests rather than a desire to ‘improve’ the existing international order.  
The US uses international law to legitimise its actions because its position as hegemon in the 
international system can only persist when it remains to be part of this very system. It engages 
in processes of justification which are active attempts to change the meaning of concepts.27 
Even though justifications generally occur after an act has taken place, this is not a reactive 
strategy but one that is aimed at creating a new normative environment that establishes 
precedents for the future. As Wunderlich argues, norm entrepreneurs’ behaviours are 
“characterised by proactivism: their actions show a considerable degree of consistency, 
strength of purpose, and intentionality, are future-oriented, and show a continuously high 
level of activism.”28 Rather than acting in secret or openly violating existing norms and laws, 
the US sought to reinterpret established provisions not only to make its own policy ‘fit’ the 
existing framework, but also to alter it in the process: “a single powerful state can, by its 
unilateral behaviour, undermine a legitimated rule. It cannot replace it with no-rule (or 
‘anarchy’) but it can provide a competing interpretation of the rule and then attempt to 
institutionalize it through legitimation.”29 In this way, the US is able to construct a permissive 
normative order that is reflective of its own interests.30 The international system is still 
important: both to enhance and also to stabilise the US’ legitimacy and by extension its 
relative power in the system. As outlined above, the system influences self-interest which is 
“constituted by norms”31 and the two can therefore not be separated from each other. 
“States need international law and institutions both to share the material and political costs 
of protecting their interests and to gain the authority and legitimacy that the possession of 
                                                 
27See also Heller, Kahl, and Pisoiu,  281.  
28Wunderlich, 45.  
29Hurd, "Breaking and Making Norms: American Revisionism and Crises of Legitimacy," 202.  
30Kerstin Fisk and Jennifer M. Ramos, "Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Preventive Self-Defense as a Cascading 
Norm," International Studies Perspectives 15 (2014).   
31Björkdahl, 48.  
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crude power can never on its own secure.”32 Norms and laws do not exist in isolation and the 
way the US is framing33 its drone policies is important in order to make these new 
interpretations fit into the broader existing normative and legal environment.  
 
Norm entrepreneurs see framing as a central part of their strategy “since, when they are 
successful, the new frames resonate with broader public understandings and are adopted as 
new ways of talking about and understanding issues.”34 Frames therefore help norm 
entrepreneurs to change agreements on intersubjective meanings on appropriate behaviour. 
For norm contestation to have an impact, new frames need to successfully displace existing 
standards and thereby establish a new logic of appropriateness.  
 
Framing the Use of Drones 
The Obama administration framed its use of drones with reference to changed 
understandings of novel threats from terrorist tactics, non-state actors and moves away from 
traditional interstate conflicts. This was different from Bush-era arguments of ‘emergency 
exemption’ or ‘US exceptionalism’35 that aimed to carve out (temporary) exceptions to the 
rule.36  Bush particularly saw international law related to the use of force as an impediment 
to counterterrorism measures. Some argue that even though the Obama Administration was 
praised for its general adherence to law, it “continued, even at times inadvertently, the Bush 
administration’s challenge on international law.”37 What is important in the context of the 
present paper is the way international legal norms were contested by Obama.  In contrast to 
Bush era’s exceptionalist policies, the Obama Administration was aiming to act as norm 
                                                 
32Andrew Hurrell, "International Law and the Changing Constitution of International Society," in The Role of Law 
in International Politics, ed. Michael Byers (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 331.   
33Norm entrepreneurs use a variety of tactics to change the context and persuade others to follow them, 
including framing, coercion, blaming and shaming. See Björkdahl; Finnemore and Sikkink; Thomas Risse, Stephen 
C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).   
34Finnemore and Sikkink,  897.  
35See for instance Andrea Liese, "Exceptional Necessity: How Liberal Democracies Contest the Prohibition of 
Torture and Ill-Treatment When Countering Terrorism," Journal of International Law and International Relations 
5, no. 1 (2009). and Fleur Johns, "Guantanamo Bay and the Annihilation of the Exception," The European Journal 
of International Law 16, no. 4 (2005).  
36There is an abundance of literature that argues the Bush administration created a ‘state of exception’ during 
its ‘global war on terror’. See for instance William Scheuerman, "Carl Schmitt and the Road to Abu Ghraib," 
Constellations 13, no. 1 (2006); Michelle Farrell, The Prohibition of Torture in Exceptional Circumstances 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).  
37Warren and Bode,  176.  
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entrepreneur to effect long-term changes in normative understandings of relevant 
international law provisions. Obama affirmed the importance of rules (rather than dismissing 
them) and argued that “we can’t exempt ourselves from the rules that apply to everyone 
else.”38  His Homeland Security Advisor, John Brennan similarly argued, “going forward, we’ll 
continue to strengthen and refine these standards and processes. As we do, we’ll look to 
institutionalize our approach more formally so that the high standards we set for ourselves 
endure over time, including as an example for other nations that pursue these capabilities.”39 
The US was not acting unilaterally regardless of international law but was building on the legal 
system’s “essentially social function by transforming applications of raw power into legitimate 
power, thereby creating rights to apply power within certain structures using certain 
means.”40  
 
At the same time, Obama confirmed the impact normative structures had on US interests and 
practices. He stated in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech” “Where force is necessary, we have 
a moral and strategic interest in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct… I believe the 
United States of America must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war.”41 It can be 
argued that reinterpreting  established standards was necessary not only because of changes 
in the way wars were being fought but also because of the emergence and proliferation of 
new technologies that made the use of unmanned weapons possible. There might be 
agreement on a particular norm in international law, but “the adherence of this norm may 
differ in the actual context of the norm’s implementation.”42 The US contested established 
meanings of legal concepts to set precedents that were aimed at creating new understandings 
of what constitutes ‘appropriate conduct’ in counterterrorism operations. Just before leaving 
office, Obama issued administrative guidelines43 that set out when drones can be used for 
                                                 
38Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony" 
(U.S. Military Academy-West Point, New York, 28 May 2014).  
39John O. Brennan, "The Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy" (paper presented at 
the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars,, Washington, D.C., 30 April 2012).  
40Michael Byers, "Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules: Customary International Law from an Interdisciplinary 
Perspective," Michigan Journal of International Law 17, no. 1 (1995): 122.  
41Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize" (Oslo City Hall, 10 
December 2009).  
42Antje Wiener, "Enacting Meaning-in-Use: Qualitative Research on Norms in International Relations," Review 
of International Studies 35, no. 1 (2009): 177.  
43Report on the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding the United States' Use of Military Force and Related 
National Security Operations, The White House.  
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counterterrorism efforts and argued that it was important to “create an architecture for this 
because the potential for abuse – given the remoteness of these weapons and their lethality, 
we’ve got to come up with a structure that governs how we’re approaching it.”44 The lasting 
impact of such normative contestation can only be assessed over the longer term, but it is still 
instructive to consider the norms’ persuasiveness. The norms’ validity is not the necessarily 
the most crucial aspect when considering contestation, because as Kennedy argues,   
in the court of world opinion, the laws in force are not necessarily the rules that are 
valid, in some technical sense, but the rules that are persuasive to relevant political 
constituencies. Whether a norm is or is not legal is a function not of its origin or 
pedigree, but of its effects. Law has an effect – is law – when it persuades an audience 
with political clout that something someone else did, or plans to do, is or is not 
legitimate. The point is no longer the validity of distinctions, but the persuasiveness of 
arguments.45  
 
The following sections outline relevant elements of the current US drone programme and 
attempts by the government to define the use of drones in counterterrorism as legitimate 
state practice. Norms that are being contested are the lawfulness of targeting individuals, the 
definition of battlefield, non-combatant immunity and what constitutes war. 
 
Justifying US Drones Policy 
Drones are used by the US for targeted killing, which can be defined as “the use of lethal force 
attributable to a subject of international law with the intent, premediation and deliberation 
to kill individually selected persons who are not in the physical custody of those targeting 
them.”46 Such killings differ from assassinations, the “murder of a targeted individual for 
political purposes,”47 that are prohibited under international as well as US domestic law. The 
norm against assassinations has been very strong for a long time48 which provides a challenge 
for any state that is arguing its deliberate and lethal targeting of individuals constitutes  
legitimate state practice. As will be discussed in more detail later, targeted killing is not 
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45David Kennedy, Of War and Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 96. (emphasis added) 
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unlawful in times of war and the US as norm entrepreneur has consistently pushed for its 
counterterrorism efforts to be regarded as part of a war effort. Justifications are made under 
the war paradigm (invoking International Humanitarian Law) rather than law enforcement 
action (under International Human Rights Law).  This distinction is subtle, but nevertheless 
important because as Sanders clarifies: “while it may be difficult at first glance to identify any 
obvious material difference between assassination and targeted killing, the former has 
historically been conceptualized as a form of extrajudicial murder that is illegal under 
domestic criminal and international human rights law, while states have claimed the latter 
conforms to relevant international humanitarian law….”49  
 
Adhering to the Rule of Law: domestic and international justifications for the use of drones  
The United States advanced two different legal frameworks to argue that its use of lethal 
force is lawful: in terms of domestic law, the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) 
that was passed by Congress one week after the 9/11 attacks is used to justify drone strikes 
and with reference to international law, the Administration points to Article 51 of the UN 
Charter and a state’s inherent right to self-defence.50  
 
Domestically, the AUMF authorises the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored 
such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism 
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.” According to some US 
government officials51, the AUMF does not restrict the statutory authority to use lethal force 
against al Qaeda and associated forces to the “hot” battlefields of Afghanistan. This means 
that the US is giving itself broad authority to engage in targeted killing operations run by the 
CIA as part of its counterterrorism efforts. The limitation of the AUMF, so the US argues, is set 
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by the targeted person and the question whether they are a senior operative of al Qaeda 
rather than firm spatial limitations of where the drone is actually employed.  
 
Most important for the current analysis, in terms of international legal provisions, the US 
justifies its conduct under Article 51 of the UN Charter, calling its actions self-defence. By 
invoking a war paradigm, justifying the targeted killing of suspected terrorists becomes 
possible in terms of International Humanitarian Law. The Geneva Conventions (Protocol I), 
allow attacks on individuals with lethal force in certain circumstances if they are considered 
combatants or legitimate targets. To justify lethal drone strikes on individuals, the laws of war 
therefore need to apply, because outside armed conflict, International Human Rights Law 
protects the right to life, making such targeting of individuals unlawful. “In wartime, 
governments use deadly force against combatants of an enemy party, in which case the 
peacetime constraints are relaxed. (…) [they] are killed not because they are guilty, but 
because they are potentially lethal agents of that hostile party.’52 By claiming that drone 
strikes take place within the context of war, they are framed as lawful battlefield operations 
against enemy combatants. 
 
The Obama Administration argued that the US is currently engaged in a non-international 
armed conflict with al Qaeda in line with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. There 
is general recognition that the nature of warfare has changed over the years and that conflicts 
are not necessarily confined to wars between states.53 The legal requirement for being able 
to use lethal force in such conflicts is that it is used against an organised armed group that 
engages in high levels of violence that uses force intensely and protractedly.54   
 
The rule of law and evidence of norm entrepreneurship  
The Obama administration was careful to justify its use of drones for targeted killing within 
the confines of the rule of law.  It consistently pointed out that it was following (rather than 
breaking) international law in its counterterrorism efforts. As argued, this line of reasoning 
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was part of the US’ efforts to change rules of international law to build a permissive normative 
order. The US did not want to be perceived as a law-breaker but wanted to effect long term 
change. Such “actions are strategically undertaken to protect its [the US’] national security 
while reshaping the international legal order to suit the interests of the single superpower.”55 
As Harold Koh, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, for instance argued, “by imposing 
on government action, law legitimates and gives credibility to governmental action.’ He 
further said: ‘Let there be no doubt: the Obama Administration is firmly committed to 
complying with all applicable law, including the laws of war, in all aspects of these ongoing 
armed conflicts.” And finally “this Administration is committed to ensuring that the targeting 
practices (…) are lawful.”56   
 
This was part of a long-term strategy – aimed at permanently changing the meaning of 
particular legal concepts to cover new types of warfare and available technologies. The goal 
was to contest and ultimately change the meaning of the rules rather than being an exception 
to them. Obama made a conscious attempt to move away from Bush-era ‘emergency’ 
justifications by arguing: “I believe in American exceptionalism with every fiber of my being: 
but what makes us exceptional is not our ability to flout international norms and the rule of 
law; it is our willingness to affirm them through our actions.”57 A few years earlier he had 
similarly criticised the previous administration’s approach, outlining the importance of 
complying with legal provisions: 
We do need to update our institutions to deal with this threat.  But we must do so 
with an abiding confidence in the rule of law and due process; in checks and balances 
and accountability.  (…) the decisions that were made over the last eight years 
established an ad hoc legal approach for fighting terrorism that was neither effective 
nor sustainable -- a framework that failed to rely on our legal traditions and time-
tested institutions, and that failed to use our values as a compass.  
 
As argued above rules enable and constrain action, and being able to shape them in line with 
the US’ own policy, is therefore advantageous in the longer term. Already in his Nobel Peace 
Prize acceptance speech, Obama had argued for moral and strategic interests linked to 
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adhering to rules of conduct, calling the US the “a standard bearer in the conduct of war.”58 
To further manifest this, Obama signed a Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) in 2013 “to 
establish a framework that governs our use of force against terrorists – insisting upon clear 
guidelines, oversight and accountability that is now codified in Presidential Policy 
Guidance.”59 The PPG recognised that “international legal principles, including respect for a 
state’s sovereignty and the laws of war, impose important constraints on the ability of the 
United States to act unilaterally – and on the way the United States can use force – in foreign 
territories.”60  Obama clearly saw the PPG as a way to establish a framework that could 
function as precedent for others to follow:  
I gave a speech at the National Defense University in which I said that we have to 
create an architecture for this because the potential for abuse -- given the remoteness 
of these weapons and their lethality, we've got to come up with a structure that 
governs how we're approaching it. And that's what we've done.  So I’ve put forward 
what’s called a presidential directive.  It’s basically a set of administrative guidelines 
whereby these weapons are being used.61  
 
These references to international law and obligations arising from them are noteworthy 
because they show that the US was concerned with being seen to act lawfully and also that it 
was consciously setting precedents that had potential to impact other states as well as the 
international order. John Brennan, for instance, argued that because the US was the first state 
to use UAVs regularly, they needed to be  
mindful that as our nation uses this technology, we are establishing precedents that 
other nations may follow… we’ll continue to strengthen and refine these standards 
and processes. As we do, we’ll look to institutionalize our approach more formally so 
that the high standards we set for ourselves endure over time, including as example 
for other nations that pursue these capabilities.  
 
These statements are all evidence that the administration was working towards 
institutionalising its approach towards terrorist threats with its own interpretations of existing 
laws. This also means that reframing or reinterpreting existing legal obligations was seen as 
inevitable to counter threats. These speeches and statements demonstrate the US’ norm 
entrepreneurship that was motivated by a perceived lack of legal clarity on these issues which 
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arose out of changes in warfare as well as available technologies. As Jeh Johnson, then 
General Counsel of the Department of Defense, argued, the US should “lead by the power of 
an example and not by the example of its power.”62 Rather than disregarding international 
law for short-term gain, the aim was to effect long-term, lasting changes in the international 
legal system. Even though the changed rules are then applicable to all states, they might still 
be deliberately ambiguous and require interpretation or allow only those capable (meaning 
the most powerful) to act in accordance with them. Designing such a permissive normative 
order that incorporates US interests legitimises US acts but at the same time limits unwanted 
actions of other states. 63   
 
The following sections focus on the main issues of controversy related to targeted drone 
strikes: firstly the lack of distinct geographical limitations of a non-international armed 
conflict, secondly the understanding of ‘self-defence’ and imminence, and thirdly the 
principles of distinction and non-combatant immunity. These issue areas show concrete US 
attempts to contest accepted meanings to make US policy fit the existing international legal 
and normative framework and changing it in the process. As argued above, justifications 
should not be seen as reactive, post-facto attempts to explain motivations for actions but 
much rather be understood as active, purpose-driven moves by the US as norm entrepreneur 
to contest the meaning of established norms, creating new meaning-in-use in the existing 
structural context. As Hurd argues, “states remake international law as they use it to pursue 
their interests. Those states are simultaneously bound and empowered.”64 In this way, state 
practice shapes norms and laws. 
 
Geographic limitations and violating state sovereignty 
Arguably because the nature of war has changed with less well-defined interstate wars, 
setting clear geographical boundaries becomes increasingly difficult. As Eric Holder, then US 
Attorney General, argued, the US is ‘at war with a stateless enemy prone to shifting 
operations from country to country’65 The US recognised that any use of force in another 
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state raised concerns with regard to that state’s sovereignty. Article 2(4) of the United Nations 
Charter prohibits the threat or use of force by one state against another with two exceptions: 
firstly, when the use of force is carried out with the consent of the host state (i.e. there is no 
infringement of the state’s sovereignty); and secondly when the use of force is in self-defence 
(Article 51) in response to an armed attack or an imminent threat, and where the host state 
is unwilling or unable to take appropriate action. 
 
The US is using drones for targeted killing in Pakistan based on claims that it is acting with the 
host state’s consent. A number of reports point to Pakistan having given tacit agreement at 
the start of the targeted killing campaign, a compromise that made US drone attacks lawful. 
The Washington Post, for instance, found that “despite repeatedly denouncing the CIA’s 
drone campaign, top officials in Pakistan’s government have for years secretly endorsed the 
program and routinely received classified briefings on strikes and casualty counts.”66 
Following the exponential increase in drone operations under Obama, however, Pakistan has 
become less and less supportive. Drone strikes in Pakistan are still taking place with the latest 
reported strike on 8 February 2018.67  
 
In Somalia and Yemen, in contrast, the US government is basing its drone strikes on arguments 
that these countries are unwilling or unable to stop the terrorist threats themselves. Since 
the CIA programme is shrouded in secrecy without any independent oversight, it is difficult 
to assess how the US determines a state to be ‘unable or unwilling’ to deal effectively with 
the threat posed to the US. This is problematic because no clear guidelines exist that can be 
independently assessed in order to establish legitimate and powerful precedents. The US is 
pushing geographical limits in counterterrorism efforts even further by arguing that 
“transnational non-state organizations such as al-Qa’ida may have no single site serving as 
their base of operations.”68 This means that for an operation to be part of the non-
international armed conflict between the US and Al-Qa’ida, Al-Qa’ida has to have ‘a significant 
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and organised presence’ at the location in question and ‘plan attacks against U.S. persons and 
interests’69  
 
There is a danger that by arguing that there are no clearly defined geographical limits, the US, 
in effect, potentially permits targeting suspects anywhere in the world. Determining the 
lawfulness of an operation solely based on an assessment who the targeted person is creates 
a dangerous precedent. By only focussing on individuals rather than the territory on which 
the drone strike is taking place, the US is extending what can be considered an ‘active 
battlefield’ in this particular conflict. The rule of law requires that no one is above the law, 
that all its subjects are treated equally and also that law needs to be transparent and 
predictable. Law’s subjects need to know what rules govern them and also how particular 
rules are enacted and interpreted. This is not possible, however, if law is applied secretively 
and any determination whether a particular conduct can be considered legal is done by one 
actor unilaterally. In order to effect long-term change in the international legal system, even 
powerful states like the US ultimately need to persuade others that their practice is 
legitimate. As Sandholtz argues, hegemons cannot change rules alone, “they, too, must rely 
on arguments and suasion.”70  
 
The US is facing a lot of criticism for this lack of geographical limitations to target suspected 
terrorists.  First indications suggest that its attempts of norm entrepreneurship to assess the 
lawfulness of an operation based on who the targeted person is rather than where the 
operation is taking place, has only limited success. For instance, the European Parliament 
adopted a resolution in February 2014 that maintains that “drone strikes outside a declared 
war by a state on the territory of another state without the consent of the latter or of the UN 
Security Council constitute a violation of international law and of the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of that country.”71 Similarly, a UK inquiry into the UK’s use of drones in 
counterterrorism concluded that it did not accept the idea of a global war without any 
geographical borders.72  
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Self-defence and the question of ‘imminence’ 
The second issue of controversy relevant to this paper is the justification of ‘self-defence’ and 
its crucial element of ‘imminence’.  Article 51 of the UN Charter sets out that “Nothing in the 
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an 
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.” The meaning and application 
of ‘self-defence’ has been broadened over the years to include anticipatory action against 
state as well as non-state actors. Looking back at the US National Security Strategy of 2002, 
the idea of using force pre-emptively is not a new concept but one that has been advanced 
by the US since 9/11 to deal with terrorist threats. The main questions relate to whether 
anticipatory action can ever be justified as ‘self-defence’ and what ‘imminence’ entails in this 
context.  
 
In terms of anticipatory action, the so-called Caroline incident of 1837 is often quoted as a 
relevant standard of customary international law. This standard is broader in its assessment 
of self-defence than that set out in Article 51 and states that anticipatory action is permissible 
if the necessity for self-defence is “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and 
no moment of deliberation.”73 Furthermore, understandings of the nature of the threat has 
been broadened to include states as well as non-state actors. This change is reflected, for 
example, in a number of Security Council Resolutions that were adopted following the 9/11 
attacks (1368, 1373 and 2249) which confirmed the right to use force in self-defence against 
terrorists. The resolutions support the idea that force can be used against non-state actors to 
‘prevent and suppress’ terrorist acts.74  
 
The most controversial issue related to such anticipatory self-defence, however, lies in the 
question of what ‘imminence’ means in this context. In 2014 the US was forced to make its 
policy with regard to the targeted killing of a US citizen public. A White Paper provided insights 
into the US’ reasoning to classify the targeted killing of Anwar al-Aulaqi, a US citizen, as a 
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lawful act of war.75 It also showed the way the government interpreted existing international 
law to justify its policy decisions. The paper sets out that in terms of imminence, the US does 
not have to “have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interest will take 
place in the immediate future.”76 The assumption is made that al Qaeda is constantly plotting 
attacks against Americans and that possible terrorist attacks pose a new kind of threat that 
are difficult to predict (“It is a drawn out, patient, sporadic pattern of attacks”). The paper 
makes the case for expanding the notion of imminence by arguing that “by its nature, 
therefore, the threat posed by al-Qa’ida and its associated forces demands a broader concept 
of imminence in judging when a person continually planning terror attacks presents an 
imminent threat, making the use of force appropriate.”77  
 
This broad view of ‘imminence’ was further supported in April 2016 when Brian Egan, then 
Legal Adviser to the US State Department, argued  
once a  State  has  lawfully  resorted  to force in self-defense against a particular armed 
group following an actual or imminent armed attack by that group, it is not necessary 
as a matter of international  law  to  reassess  whether  an  armed  attack  is  imminent  
prior  to every  subsequent  action  taken  against  that  group,  provided  that  
hostilities have not ended.78  
 
This is a troubling assessment as there is no need for the US to prove an actual attack is being 
planned or is going to happen. It is broader than justifications established in the Caroline 
incident that requires a threat to be ‘instant’, ‘leaving no moment of deliberation’. It is also 
speculative as the Administration does not even need to have information on a specific attack 
that is being planned or to be confident that ‘no strike is about to occur’. There is no neutral 
or independent assessment to challenge the conclusion that a threat is in fact ‘imminent’, 
which would make the use of force lawful in certain circumstances. By doing so, the US is 
acting as norm entrepreneur, contesting the meaning of ‘imminence’, thereby lowering the 
threshold of what is meant by ‘significant threat’ considerably. This contestation was justified 
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by the Administration by arguing that the concept needed to be more flexible and broad “in 
light of the modern-day capabilities, techniques and technological innovations of terrorist 
organizations.”79  International law is a developing system, a process that responds to 
changes and the US can therefore be seen as working through existing mechanisms of legal 
change. In this process and as the most powerful state, it can exploit ambiguities arising from 
contestations and can advance a permissive normative order that accommodates its 
counterterrorism policies.  
 
Principle of distinction  
The final aspect of controversy relevant to this paper is the principle of distinction between 
combatants and non-combatants that is central to International Humanitarian Law 
(particularly the Geneva Conventions). As argued above, the nature of warfare has changed 
to include conflicts of a non-international nature, involving combatants without clearly 
distinguishable uniforms. It is unlawful under the laws of war to directly target non-
combatants.80 The requirement for proportionality also means that collateral damage (i.e. the 
unintentional killing of non-combatants) must be kept to a minimum and be proportionate to 
the attack.81 Obama argued that these principles of distinction and proportionality were 
adhered to, stating that Congress only authorised CIA strikes “if we have a high degree of 
confidence that innocent civilians will not be injured or killed, except in the rarest of 
circumstances.”82 Obama also said that “there must be near-certainty that no civilian will be 
killed or injured –the highest standard we can set.”83  
 
The US has come under a lot of criticism for giving extraordinarily low numbers of collateral 
deaths in its drone campaigns. In 2011, John Brennan reportedly claimed that not a single 
non-combatant had been killed in a year of strikes. And a year later, another senior 
administration official is said to have claimed that “the number of civilians killed in drone 
strikes in Pakistan under Mr. Obama was in the ‘single digits’ — and that independent counts 
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of scores or hundreds of civilian deaths unwittingly draw on false propaganda claims by 
militants.”84 A number of commentators and reporters claimed that these low numbers were 
based on the idea that all military aged men were considered combatants. This has been 
strenuously denied by the government. The relevant Policy Guidance does not clearly define 
what a non-combatant is but outlines the concept as follows:  
Non-combatants are individuals who may not be made the object of attack under 
applicable international law. The term “non-combatant” does not include an 
individual who is part of a belligerent party to an armed conflict, an individual who is 
taking a direct part in hostilities, or an individual who is targetable in the exercise of 
national self-defense. Males of military age may be non-combatants; it is not the case 
that all military-aged males in the vicinity of a target are deemed to be combatants.85  
 
In 2016, Brian Egan, further set out “Among other things, the United States may consider 
certain operational activities, characteristics, and identifiers when determining whether an 
individual is taking a direct part in hostilities or whether the individual may formally or 
functionally be considered a member of an organized armed group which we are engaged in 
an armed conflict.”86 These (rather vague) guidelines mean that determining whether or not 
an individual can be considered to be a combatant is still dependent on individual 
assessments and interpretations rather than based on objective, reproducible criteria. 
 
Distinguishing combatants from non-combatants in non-international conflicts is difficult and 
the Obama administration did not find a plausible way of explaining its targeting decisions 
that would lead to new normative understandings of what constitutes a ‘legitimate target’. 
This problem became obvious in April 2014 when two hostages were killed in a so-called 
signature strike of the CIA. ‘Signatures’ are indicators that are associated with terrorist 
behaviour that then justify a drone strike. This can be gatherings of men, convoys or 
individuals carrying weapons. This is problematic because as “some State Department officials 
have complained to the White House (…)  the criteria used by the C.I.A. for identifying a 
terrorist ‘signature’ were too lax. The joke was that when the C.I.A. sees ‘three guys doing 
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jumping jacks,’ the agency thinks it is a terrorist training camp.”87 Obama publicly apologised 
for this particular attack, but the fact that two hostages were killed that the US didn’t even 
know were in the vicinity led many critics (see for instance the American Civil Liberties Union) 
to comment that the US did not actually know who it was killing. The White House admitted 
that the Policy Guidelines it issued in 2013 might need to be changed: ‘in the aftermath of a 
situation like this, it raises legitimate questions about whether additional changes need to be 
made to those protocols.’    
 
In July 2016, in a first move to address critics and to increase transparency, Obama released 
aggregate figures of casualties in its drones programme and issued an Executive Order on US 
Policy on Pre- and Post-Strike Measures to Address Civilian Casualties in U.S. Operations 
Involving the Use of Force.88 Emphasising its aim to set binding precedents in the international 
legal order, the White House acknowledged “the need to be as transparent as possible (…) in 
order to enhance the public’s confidence (…), set standards for other nations to follow, and 
counter terrorist propaganda and false accusations about U.S. operations.”89 Similarly, Egan 
stated that “it is important that our actions be understood as lawful by others both at home 
and abroad in order to show respect for the rule of law and promote it more broadly, while 
also cultivating partnerships and building coalitions.”90 Lisa Monaco, then Assistant to the 
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, emphasised the need to be seen to 
act legitimately to further strengthen the US’ position in the international community by 
arguing that “we know that not only is greater transparency the right thing to do, it is the best 
way to maintain the legitimacy of our counterterrorism actions and the broad support of our 
allies.”91 Even though the move towards more transparency was generally welcomed as long 
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overdue by civil rights groups, they remained critical of the low numbers that were provided 
by the administration, arguing that they were “only a fraction of those recorded” by 
investigative journalists.92 Such criticisms highlight the need for the Administration to be 
clearer on its definition of ‘non-combatants’ in order to put its figures into context.  
 
Conclusions 
The Obama Administration’s justifications for its drone policy showed contestation of 
established norms and rules in international law. The US was acting as norm entrepreneur, 
arguing that its actions were done with respect to the rule of law. The challenge was therefore 
not an outright ‘assault’ on international law but contestation and renegotiation of 
established norms’ and laws’ meanings-in-use. It is clear that the Obama Administration was 
aiming to have a long-term effect on the meaning of particular concepts as the rhetoric 
changed from exceptionalism towards an emphasis on new technologies and new kinds of 
warfare that made changes in understanding international law necessary. The aim was to 
alter the shared understanding of accepted legal norms and legal provisions in the longer 
term. The result was not necessarily a weakening of those norms but a renewed 
argumentation and debate on how they can be interpreted in the current context. The US 
aimed to normalise its conduct, framing its actions within the terms of international law. The 
paper’s analysis of the US’ use of drones in counterterrorism efforts has demonstrated the 
importance of norm entrepreneurs as agents that effect normative change. Structures (such 
as those provided by existing legal obligations) are important, as they enable and constrain 
action, but the present analysis shows that agency is crucial in the process of norm 
contestation. Normative change results from intentional action taken by norm entrepreneurs 
within the structure and “agents’ perception, situation analysis, goal setting, and intentional 
action […] decide in which way external change affects the regime and its norms.”93 
 
International law is a process that is necessarily flexible - it needs to adapt to be able to cover 
changes, such as the emergence of new technologies that enable different strategies of 
warfare. International law is not rendered out of date by these contestations. The US, as 
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hegemon, was acting in its long-term interest, aiming to create a permissive normative order. 
However, hegemony is a status, based on social relations and not a given attribute, which 
means that the US needed to be seen by others as acting legitimately in order to secure its 
position in the international system. This is important, because “losing legitimacy means 
losing power, and losing enough legitimacy may produce a situation in which American claims 
to power are unsustainable in practice.”94 The US is therefore working with international law’s 
legitimising and enabling power which also requires support from other states in order to 
manifest the legal change it aims to effect. US interests are influenced by the normative 
structure in which it acts. Law cannot be fully separated from power and interests and a 
powerful state cannot single-handedly change international law; it must persuade others to 
support the proposed changes in order to have a long-term effect. Persuasion and being seen 
to act legitimately by others are still key for being a successful norm entrepreneur. When 
others follow the new meaning-in-use of a norm, that norm can then be argued to have been 
successfully contested. In this context, there are suggestions that the norm prohibiting 
targeted killing as counterterrorism strategy has been successfully contested and is starting 
to be embedded in the international order.95 The long term effects of US drone policy will 
become more evident in the years to come. In line with Kennedy it can be concluded that “the 
story has not ended. The pebble of American assertion has dropped in the pond, and it may 
be many years and many conflicts before we can evaluate its effects.”96 Should the US be 
successful in its attempts, it will ultimately create an international order that is more 
accommodating to US interests but not one that is necessarily entirely dominated by one 
state’s national interests.  
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